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INTRODUCTION
Harold H Bruff*

ecent years have not been happy ones for Congress. Our national legislature, eternally a target for sniping, has endured heightened and relentless
criticism of almost every aspect of its activities. In response, Congress has seriously investigated its own operations.' Some reform has occurred, most prominently the passage of the Congressional Accountability Act, which applies many
important regulatory statutes to Congress for the first time.2 Yet much remains
to be done.
As citizens, we ought to ensure that our criticisms of Congress are constructive, lest we damage ourselves. In that spirit, the American Bar Association's
Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice created a special Congressional Process Committee to study selected aspects of congressional procedures and to recommend appropriate reforms. The Committee, which I chair,
is composed of administrative lawyers who are experienced in legislative practice,
or who have worked in Congress. We decided to address selected aspects of
congressional structure and procedure for which we believe administrative lawyers possess relevant expertise.
The articles that form this Symposium grew out of that effort. Prepared by
a talented group of young lawyers and professors, the articles originated as
analytic reports to the Committee, which the Committee used as grist for its
deliberations. I must issue a disclaimer: the articles do not represent positions
of the Section or of the ABA, which have yet to take formal action on the
Committee's recommendations. Nevertheless, I give them my personal testimonial as insightful analyses of important problems that Congress confronts.
Three articles follow. The first, by my colleague Theresa Gabaldon, considers
the structure of ethics regulation in Congress. The second, by David Frederick,
a counselor to the Inspector General of the Justice Department but a lawyer
with Shearman & Sterling when he wrote the article, reviews the process of
ethics regulation. The third, by Professor Neal Devins of William & Mary,
looks at the methods for resolving congressional-executive information access
* Rothschild Research Professor of Law, George Washington University.
I, See ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS: FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, S. REP. No. 215, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. REP. No. 413, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995). Seegenerally Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall
Bind Equally on All: Congressional and Executive Roles in Applying Laws to Congress, 48 ARK. L. REv.

105 (1995).
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disputes. Each of the three combines analytic rigor with attention to the practical
realities of life in Congress. Here is a preview of what they contain.

I. The Structure of Congressional Ethics Regulation
Professor Gabaldon's analysis of the structure of congressional ethics regulation begins with recognition that Article I, section 5, of the Constitution grants
each house of Congress power to police the behavior of its members. From a
legal standpoint, it is doubtful that the power to impose discipline on members
of Congress could be delegated to anyone outside of Congress; from an accountability standpoint, it would be undesirable to do so. Therefore, Congress must
self-regulate the ethics of its members. Within the scope of the "Speech or
Debate" privilege, it must do so without the aid of executive branch prosecutors
and criminal courts. Congress has been actively considering ways to improve
its performance of this function. 3
The nature of ethics regulation in Congress is similar to regulation of attorney
ethics by the organized bar. In her article, Professor Gabaldon draws lessons
from the regulation of our own profession, while always considering the special
institutional nature of Congress. Congressional self-regulation, like that of lawyers, rarely culminates in formal sanctions. She emphasizes, however, that simple disclosure of questionable behavior is a more potent sanction for members
of Congress than for lawyers. As recent events in Congress have illustrated,
looming disciplinary proceedings can cause resignations or electoral defeats.
Both houses of Congress have ethics codes that combine the strictures of
various statutes, such as the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 4 with rules
promulgated by each house. Along with many specific restrictions, the codes
of both houses contain broad, "catchall" standards forbidding behavior that
would discredit the institution. As Professor Gabaldon explains, Congress has
not developed an institutional capacity to review and coordinate its ethics rules
continuously. The growing volume of ethics rules increases the likelihood of
inadvertent, but politically costly, violations by members. Here, she argues,
Congress could profit from the example of the organized bar. The ABA's Model
Rules for Professional Conduct, which are about 100 pages long, are the product
of an ongoing process that attempts to ensure that attorneys' ethics are governed
by an understandable and comprehensive code.'
Professor Gabaldon believes that reassessment of congressional ethics rules

3. See generally DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS (1995) (arguing for a practical approach
to the problems of self-regulation).
4. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
5. ABA Committee on Government Standards (Cynthia R. Farina, Reporter), Keeping Faith:
Government Ethics & Government Ethics Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 287 (1993). This report considers
the overall nature of ethics regulation of public servants and is a helpful guide. The Committee
on Government Standards is a multi-section committee assembled under the charge of the ABA
Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. The Committee is funded by the Board
of Governors and various sections of the ABA.
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would profit from the participation of outsiders. Substantial gaps exist between
congressional mores and public perceptions of propriety. For example, members
of Congress believe they can separate constituent service efforts from a person's
status as a campaign contributor; many citizens do not share this belief. The
presence of public members on a body created to review the ethics rules and
to recommend appropriate changes would help to ensure that the rules reflect
values held by the people. At the same time, as long as the houses retain
the responsibility for deciding which rules should actually govern them, their
constitutional responsibility for their own discipline would remain intact.
The codification process, she argues, should strive to maximize the specificity
of standards of conduct that are to be enforced through the disciplinary system.
Existing prohibitions of conduct that discredits the member's house create problems of fair notice to affected members and of insufficient guidance to those who
enforce ethics standards. Moreover, the existence of these standards invites abuse
of the system by a person's political opponents. On the other hand, retaining
catchall standards allows discipline for unforeseen cases, and deters undesirable
behavior that skirts specific prohibitions. Congress' strategy, then, could be to
retain such standards while lessening reliance on them for most cases. Ethical
rules for attorneys have moved away from such formulations as the "appearance
of impropriety" toward more specific standards. An effort to codify congressional
ethics rules could include special attention to the identification and articulation
of behavior that does indeed discredit the institution.
The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct investigates allegations of misconduct by Representatives and recommends sanctions to the full
House. In 1991, the Committee bifurcated its investigatory and adjudicative
functions, so that different committee members perform these two tasks. The
Committee also has an Office of Advice and Education; reliance on its advice
protects a Representative from investigation by the Committee. In the Senate,
the Select Committee on Ethics investigates alleged senatorial misconduct and
recommends sanctions to the full Senate. It does not employ bifurcation. In
1994, the Senate Ethics Study Commission considered, but failed to recommend,
bifurcation. 6 Accordingly, it outlined a structure for bifurcation if the Senate
chose to adopt it.
As Professor Gabaldon reveals, substantial criticism surrounds the structure
of congressional ethics regulation. Self-regulation in small bodies such as the
houses of Congress creates some conflicts of interest and fosters widespread
public perception of cozy and ineffective regulation. Service on the committees
is also time-consuming and unpleasant for their members. Proposals have arisen
to use outsiders to perform some of the preliminary functions of investigating
charges and recommending sanctions to the houses of Congress. Most proposals
suggest mixed panels to be composed of some sitting members of Congress and
some outsiders, who might be former members, retired federal judges, or other
6. SENATE ETHICS STUDY COMM'N, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., RECOMMENDING
PROCEDURES OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS (Comm. Print 1994).
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distinguished citizens. Both houses have seriously considered using outsiders in
the ethics enforcement process.'
Professor Gabaldon argues that a mixed system could retain the understanding
and empathy that promotes the fairness of self-regulation, while adding a degree
of detachment that should increase public confidence in the rigor of inquiries.
Moreover, a system that includes independent outsiders should be better able
to clear members of suspected misconduct than one composed solely of their
colleagues. The scarce time of the members would also be saved to the extent
that tasks are shifted to outsiders. As long as the actual imposition of sanctions
remains in the hands of members of Congress, there should be no constitutional
infirmities in this scheme.
The structure of ethics regulation for lawyers has implications for the congressional system. The states enforce their rules through bifurcated systems in which
the disciplinary counsel who initiates charges is separate from the board that hears
them. Although Professor Gabaldon believes that the case has not been made for
an independent prosecutor within Congress, she believes that some aspects of this
scheme are worth adopting. First, the system of bifurcated adjudication that the
House has chosen should be extended to the Senate. Administrative lawyers see
daily the benefits of separation of the functions of investigation and adjudication
in ensuring fairness;8 those benefits should occur in the congressional context.
Second, Congress should increase its staffing to allow for more effective support functions. The Office of Compliance, recently created by the Congressional
Accountability Act, 9 could be charged with separating ethics complaints from
administrative ones, furnishing continuing legal education on ethics matters,
and providing an expanded advice-giving function. The goal would be to shift
ethics enforcement from a punitive to a preventative role to the extent possible.
Education and advice are obviously critical to this goal. It is also important to
give the staff clear and consistent roles to play. For example, advice-giving and
prosecuting should not be performed by the same individuals.
II.

The Process for Ethics Enforcement

As David Frederick explains, in the Senate the ethics enforcement process
begins when a complaint is filed with the Select Committee on Ethics; the filing
is not confidential. A preliminary inquiry follows to determine whether there
is reason to believe misconduct has occurred. If so, an initial review determines
whether there is "substantial credible evidence" of a violation; if so, a formal

7. The Senate's Ethics Study Commission recommended against the employment of outsiders.
Id. at 12. The House members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress recommended in favor. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS: FINAL REPORT OF THE HOUSE MEMBERS OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, H.R. REP. No. 413, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993). To date, neither house has implemented such a process.
8. Seegenerally Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the FederalAdministrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1981).
9. Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995).
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investigation follows, resulting in a report stating what occurred and what sanction the Committee recommends.
In the House, separate subcommittees conduct the investigative and adjudicatory phases of the process, and the full Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct holds a final sanction hearing to decide what punishment to recommend
to the House. The House Committee does not accept complaints concerning
events that took place before the third previous Congress. Mr. Frederick considers whether the Senate should adopt a similar limitation rule. He recommends
that the Senate retain the flexibility to pursue all charges of misconduct without
a formal statute of limitations, while considering fairness to respondents on a
case-by-case basis.
In both houses, the multistage process that is intended to ensure fairness to
respondents tends, in practice, to produce damaging headlines as each stage
passes. The ethics enforcement process is also very time-consuming for both
houses, due in part to the efforts of counsel for respondents to litigate fully
every issue at each stage. In the House of Representatives, the benefits of
bifurcation compensate for this disadvantage; no such advantage obtains in the
Senate. Mr. Frederick argues that each of the houses should employ a bifurcated
system that authorizes dismissal of unsubstantiated complaints and that consolidates the stages of inquiry to minimize repetition.
After canvassing the nature of competing models of regulatory process, such
as the criminal law and attorney self-regulation, Mr. Frederick turns to particular issues of procedure in Congress. He suggests that Congress consider innovative ways to accommodate efficiency and fairness concerns. For example, the
Senate Committee recently sought and obtained enforcement of a subpoena for
Senator Packwood's diaries."0 The Committee followed procedures that were
designed to protect the respondent's privacy interests while ensuring access to
materials needed in the investigation. Hence, the Committee appointed a neutral
party to examine the diaries and to separate their contents. Mr. Frederick
explains that this case reveals the potential for Fourth and Fifth Amendment
issues to arise in ethics investigations. He argues that both houses should respect
the constitutional rights of their members who are subject to investigation. Members of Congress, like private citizens who are subpoenaed in congressional
investigations, should enjoy the right to the assistance of counsel, and the attorney-client, work product, and spousal privileges. The right to be confronted
with and to cross-examine adverse witnesses should also be honored in a manner
that is consistent with the privacy interests of the witnesses.

III. Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes
Professor Neal Devins examines the procedural dilemmas that attend congressional subpoenas against executive branch officials. Recent years have seen

10. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1994).
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several bitterly contested battles over information between the two branches.
Professor Devins reviews these case studies in search of lessons to be learned
by Congress. He discovers a rich history of informal negotiations between the
branches that successfully resolves most, but not all, information demands.
When stalemate does occur, court processes are sought.
At present, Congress has two formal techniques for enforcing its subpoenas.
One of them, the criminal contempt process, is useless when executive officers,
rather than private parties, are involved. Executive branch prosecutors will
not initiate criminal proceedings against their colleagues who refuse to provide
information to Congress. Nor should they, because subpoenas are resisted only
after the president has decided to invoke executive privilege-subordinate officers are merely executing these presidential commands. The other technique,
a civil proceeding brought by a house of Congress to enforce its demands, is
possessed by the Senate. Yet this authority does not extend to subpoenas against
executive officers." The House of Representatives has yet to obtain civil enforcement authority. Thus both houses prefer to rely on informal pressures to force
executive disclosures.
Professor Devins reviews the "law" of executive privilege against Congress.
The quotation marks reflect the fact that of actual law there is none, merely
assertions of power by both branches. In United States v. Nixon, 2 the Supreme
Court expressly left the issue of executive privilege against Congress open.' 3 Ever
since, the executive has argued that it has broad authority to refuse congressional
demands for information; Congress has rejoined with equally broad claims of
authority to compel information. The lower courts have attempted to mediate
the squabbles.
It may be surprising that Congress has not sought formal civil subpoena
authority against the executive, but Professor Devins persuasively explains that
members of Congress believe that informal sanctions, such as threats to reduce
appropriations or to reject nominees, are more effective. Yet there is a disadvantage to these informal pressures-they have little or nothing to do with the
merits of contests over information. Consequently, informal process threatens
to foster inefficiency in government. Professor Devins recommends that Congress obtain and employ civil enforcement authority for subpoenas against the
executive. The courts can continue to mediate these contests without vesting
absolute control over information in either branch. The goal would be to confine
informal negotiations that concern information transfers between the branches
to matters relevant to the controversy at hand.

11.

28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988).

12. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
13. Id. at 712 n.19.

